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Poor Women Fall
INTRODUCTION
On June 30, 1980, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided Harris v. McRae.1 The case presented the
Court with a variety of challenges to the Hyde Amendment, 2
which prohibits the use of federal funds for many therapeutic
abortions. Although the primary attack on the statute was
based upon constitutional grounds,3 it was also contended
that Title XIX of the Social Security Act required participat-
ing states to continue funding medically necessary abortions
even if matching federal funds could be legally withheld. In a
5-4 decision,4 the Supreme Court rejected both challenges,
finding the Hyde Amendment to be above constitutional re-
proach and further finding no basis to require independent
state funding under Title XIX.5
To even the most detached observer, the decision in Har-
ris, which denies health benefits to eligible persons solely be-
cause the "medically necessary" treatment which they seek
involves the fundamental right to have an abortion, seems ex-
traordinarily short-sighted, shallow and wrong. The discussion
which follows will highlight the inadequacies of the Harris
decision by examining the relationship between the Hyde
1 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
2 See notes 13-23 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the many ver-
sions of the Hyde Amendment.
3 See generally Note, Constitutional Law-Abortion-No Requirement to Pro-
vide Medicaid Funds for Nontherapeutic Abortions Under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act of 1965 or the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 TUL. L. REV. 179 (1977).
The five justices in the majority were Stewart, Burger, White, Powell, and
Rehnquist. The four dissenting justices were Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens.
' Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2693 (1980).
Generally, Title XIX of the Social Security Act works to provide public fund-
ing for "medically necessary" services which eligible persons cannot afford. For a dis-
cussion of the purposes of Title XIX and of the requirement that the requested ser-
vices be medically necessary, see notes 35-39 infra and accompanying text.
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Amendment and Title XIX of the Social Security Act, by ana-
lyzing the constitutional issues with which the Court was con-
fronted, and by exploring the far-reaching and disastrous im-
pact of the Court's decision. It will be seen that the Harris
decision indeed "marks a retreat from Roe v. Wade7 and rep-
resents a cruel blow to the most powerless members of our
society.""
I. THE SCORE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE HYDE AMENDMENT
A workable understanding of the issues that confronted
the Harris Court, as well as the possible reasons for which
those issues were wrongly resolved, cannot be acquired
without first examining the Hyde Amendment itself: its legis-
lative history; the moral touchstones of its character; and its
interrelationship with Title XIX of the Social Security Act
(hereinafter referred to as the Medicaid Act).
A. The Evolution of the Hyde Amendment
1. Constitutional Law Prior to the Amendment
The battle over Medicaid funding for abortions began a
year after the landmark case of Roe v. Wade.' In Roe, the Su-
preme Court declared that the right of personal privacy en-
compassed a woman's right to choose to terminate her preg-
nancy, ruling that a Texas statute criminalizing abortion
except when necessary to save the mother's life violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court,
however, carefully explained that the woman's privacy right
eventually must yield to the state's interest in protecting the
health of the mother and the unborn child.10 The state inter-
"410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8 Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2706 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the fundamental right to an abortion was found to
exist within the larger concept known as "zones of privacy." Id. at 156-58. This right
of privacy was found to emanate from the fourteenth amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty. The Court, however, recognized other constitutional sources for this
right, including the ninth amendment's reservation of rights to the people. Id. at 152-
53.
10 While the Court held that the right of privacy encompassed a woman's deci-
sion to terminate her pregnancy, it made clear that this right was not without limita-
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est was found to be "compelling," and, therefore, sufficient to
override individual freedom of choice, after the first trimester
of pregnancy.11
Given the enormous impact that Roe had upon state
abortion laws, questions concerning the scope of that decision
were inevitable. A question of great importance was whether
the federal government would be required to provide indigent
women, through Medicaid funding, the economic resources
necessary to terminate their pregnancies. 2 In 1973, a bill that
restricted funding for abortions was introduced, but it was
never adopted.13 The following year produced the Bartlett
Amendment which would have prohibited the use of any
Health, Education, and Welfare (hereinafter HEW) funds for
abortions.14 This bill was also defeated, and there were no leg-
islative restrictions placed on the availability of funds for
abortions. Finally, during fiscal year 1976-77 the first abortion
funding restriction bill was adopted, an amendment drafted
by Representative Henry J. Hyde."5
The original Hyde Amendment provided that Medicaid
funds could not be used for abortions unless the mother's life
was endangered,18 but the Amendment's effect was short-
lived. Soon after the bill's passage, the United States Eastern
District Court of New York held that the restrictions were un-
constitutional, granting an injunction against HEW prohibit-
ing the denial of Medicaid reimbursement for elective abor-
tions. 1  Nevertheless, in the very next year the House of
tions. Id. at 162-66. The Court pointed out that a "pregnant woman cannot be iso-
lated in her privacy .... [I]t is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that
at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of poten-
tial human life, becomes significantly involved." Id. at 159.
" Id. Other permissible regulations suggested by the Court were: (1) regulations
as to the licensing of persons who perform the abortion; and (2) regulations as to the
licensing of the facility. Id.
12 President Carter felt that the federal government was under no duty to make
these funds available. See note 33 infra for President Carter's statement on the issue.
'3 Act, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 114, 87 Stat. 716 (Dec. 17, 1973).
14 Act, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-048, § 1-2, 89 Stat. 247 (July 1, 1975).
" Dept. of Labor and HEW Approp. Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90
Stat. 1434 (1976).
16 Id.
17 McRae v. Matthews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
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Representatives approved an identical version of the Hyde
Amendment. The Senate, however, insisted on less restrictive
language, and a compromise was reached.18 Because this tenu-
ous substantive compromise was a rider to an appropriations
bill,19 it has been the subject of annual challenge and debate.
The current version of the Hyde Amendment, applicable for
fiscal year 1980, provides:
[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall
be used to perform abortions except where the life of the
mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term; or, except for such medical procedures necessary for
victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been
reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public
health service.20
The Harris Court noted that the present version of the
Amendment is broader than that applicable for fiscal year
1977,21 which did not include the "rape or incest" exception,
yet narrower than that applicable for most of fiscal year 1978
(and all of fiscal year 1979) which included an exception for
"instances where severe and long-lasting physical health dam-
age to the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried
to term when so determined by two physicians. ' '22 The Court
stated, however, that its decision in Harris would apply as
18 The compromise version reads as follows:
IN]one of the funds provided for in this paragraph shall be used to perform
abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the
fetus were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary
for the victims of rape or incest, when such rape or incest has been reported
promptly to a law enforcement agency, or public health service; or except in
those instances where severe and long-lasting health damage to the mother
would result if the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by
two physicians.
Continuing Approp. Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977).
'9 Dept. of Labor and HEW Approp. Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92
Stat. 1586 (1978).
2 Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979). See also Pub. L. No. 96-86, §
118, 93 Stat. 662 (1979).
2' See Dept. of Labor and HEW Approp. Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209,
90 Stat. 1434 (1976).
22 Joint Res. Continuing Approp., Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460
(1977); HEW Approp. Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat 1586 (1978).
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well to all earlier versions of the Amendment. 3
2. Moral and Political Overtones
The content of the Hyde Amendment has always been
highly controversial.24 Both the proponents and opponents of
the Amendment maintain that their view is morally correct,
leaving little room for objective discussion.25 The sponsor of
the Amendment has proclaimed that "killing ... unborn chil-
dren" is not a solution to the poverty cycle.21 It has further
been said that abortion "is one way to get rid of poor people.
Let us call that pooricide. '27 On the other hand, the Amend-
ment's detractors claim discrimination 8 and maintain that
the legislature is not a moral decision-maker.2 9 As stated by
2' In a footnote to the majority opinion it was stated that "the term, 'Hyde
Amendment,' is used generically to refer to all three versions of the Hyde Amend-
ment, except where indicated otherwise." Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2681 n.4
(1980).
24 The legislative history is replete with rhetoric:
Hyde: "We hear the claim that the poor are denied a right available to
other women if we do not use tax money to fund abortions. Well, make a
list of all the things society denies poor women and let them make the
choice of what we will give them."
Flood: "This [Hyde Amendment] is blatantly discriminatory .... It pro-
hibits abortion for poor people. A vote for this amendment is not a vote
against abortion. It is a vote against poor people. That is what it is, as plain
as the nose on your face."
122 CONG. REc. H20410-11 (1976).
2' See, e.g., 122 CONG. REc. H8638 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Noland) for a pro-
Hyde view-
The reverence for life embodied in the Hyde Amendment amounts to a sig-
nificant reaffirmation of what is best in the American character. Your vote
today in favor of the Hyde Amendment is a vote of confidence in our coun-
try and our ability to assure a good and productive life for all our citizens.
which may be contrasted with:
[The Hyde Amendment] really is a measure of our commitment to the idea
that the Government has an obligation to help indigent citizens obtain
proper medical care .... I think it is a very bad idea for a group of politi-
cians ... to sit around and attempt to decide which operations should be
funded ....
122 CONG. REC. H26057 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Pattison).
26 122 CONG. REc. H26785 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Hyde).
27 Id.
28 "This is blatantly discriminatory .... " 122 CONG. REC. H20411 (1976) (re-
marks of Rep. Flood).
29 It has been noted that it is difficult to call abortion immoral: "To say that
1980-81]
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one ardent opponent of the Amendment, "The House of Rep-
resentatives was created to make the laws by which our coun-
try is governed. But the Congress most definitely is not gifted
with the ability to make moral decisions for an entire na-
tion.' 'ao Opponents also argue that an appropriations bill is a
particularly inappropriate vehicle for effecting an emotionally
charged policy determination.31
When Representative Henry J. Hyde, the author of the
Amendment, was asked by President Carter if he was con-
cerned about the fact that his bill was denying poor women
abortions, he replied, "Life is unfair.13 2 The "fairness of life" 33
has engendered many bitter battles over the last four versions
of the Hyde Amendment, which have been attached as riders
abortion, while legal is immoral but that only the poor shall be saved from this immo-
rality by a fastidious government is not only unfair but absurd." Morrow, Of Abor-
tion and the Unfairness of Life, TIME, August 1, 1977, at 49. "The suggestion that
abortion is not so immoral that the state may prohibit it altogether but sufficiently
immoral that the state may rescue the poor from it, is absurd, even perverse." Perry,
The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American
Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1244 (1978).
Of course, some persons assert that abortion is immoral. "I think the unborn
children whose lives are being snuffed out, even though they might not be adults have
a right to live, too, regardless of the mistaken and immoral Supreme Court decision."
122 CONG. REc. H20411 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Bauman).
1* 124 CONG. REC. H311 (daily ed. June 8, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Pattison). See
also "The Hyde Amendment is a typical attempt to prohibit the use of money in an
appropriations bill for some purpose that the amendment sponsors do not like ..
122 CONG. REc. S20892 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Packwood).
3' The propriety of utilizing an appropriations bill to effectuate this anti-abor-
tion policy has been severely criticized: "[T]he Senate should not through a funding
decision in effect deprive our most vulnerable and helpless citizens, the poor, of an
established constitutional right." 123 CONG. REC. S11035 (daily ed. June 29, 1977)(re-
marks of Sen. Brooke). See also 123 CONG. REC. H6083 (daily ed. June 17, 1977)
(remarks of Rep. Holtzman); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 131 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 888 (1980).
32 IX WOMEN TODAY 90 (August 6, 1979). Following Rep. Hyde's remark, the
National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) presented its first "Life is Unfair"
award to Hyde. Id.
" President Carter also has addressed this issue of federally funded abortions:
[A]s you know there are many things in life that are not fair, that wealthy
people can afford and poor people can't. But I don't believe that the Fed-
eral Government should take action to try to make these opportunities
exactly equal, particularly when there is a moral factor involved.
N.Y. Times, July 13, 1977 § A, at 1, col. 5.
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to HEW appropriation bills.ss The ultimate battle was waged
before the Supreme Court in Harris, where a majority of jus-
tices viewed the "fairness of life" with a degree of aloofness
equal to that of Representative Hyde.
B. The Medicaid Act and State Funding
1. Necessary Medical Services and Therapeutic Abortions
The Medicaid Act establishes a federal medical assistance
plan that allows the federal and state governments to share
the expenses of providing necessary medical services to needy
persons. 5 The two express purposes of the Act are: (1) to pro-
vide medical care for persons unable to meet the cost; and (2)
to insure that these same people are able to retain their po-
tential for independence or self-care.36
In Beal v. Doe,37 the Supreme Court recognized that the
primary purpose of the Medicaid Act was to "enable each
state, as far as practicable, to furnish medical assistance to
individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to
meet the costs of necessary medical services."3
To come within the scope of the Medicaid Act, therefore,
therapeutic abortions must be considered "necessary medical
services."
Since the Act does not specifically mention abortions, it
might be argued that no abortions should be funded upon its
authority.3 9 Were this viewpoint to prevail, of course, the
raison d'9tre of the Hyde Amendment would vanish. This po-
sition was accepted by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
" See note 31 supra for a discussion of the impropriety of effecting a moral
policy decision via an appropriations bill.
5 42 U.S.C. § 1396 a(a)(10)(A)-(C) (1976). This program set up a system of "cat-
egorically needy" (persons with dependent children, and the aged, blind, and dis-
abled) and "medically needy" (all others unable to afford necessary medical care).
The participating states must provide services for the categorically needy and may
elect to provide additionally for the medically needy.
" See also Russo, State Funding of Elective Abortions: The Supreme Court De-
fers to the Legislator, 46 U. CINN. L. REv. 1003, 1004 (1978).
37 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
Id. at 444.
3' See also Butler, The Right to Medicaid Payment for Abortion, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 931, 941 (1977).
1980-81]
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Doe v. Rose,40 which stated: "[W]e lack specific guidance as to
whether Congress intended that abortions be covered by
Medicaid and, if so, more critically, which abortions were to
be covered by Medicaid benefits. 41 Another argument that
might be voiced in support of exclusion has its genesis in Beal
v. Doe,42 a case which implicitly held that a state participating
in Title XIX is not required by statute to finance "elective"
abortions.43 If "elective," however, is construed to mean not
"medically necessary" or "nontherapeutic," Beal is valueless
as a grounds for excluding therapeutic abortions from the
Act's coverage.
In support of the position that abortions were meant to
be within the provisions of Title XIX, some scholars have
urged that the "family planning services" amendment to the
Medicaid Act encompasses abortions.44 More convincing sup-
port for inclusion does exist, however, and this support can be
found, ironically enough, in Beal. The Court's rejection of the
premise that "nontherapeutic" abortions were meant to be
covered by the Act creates the negative implication that ther-
apeutic abortions were, in fact, intended to be within the Act's
coverage. 45 In addition, the Beal Court implied that therapeu-
tic abortions are indeed medically necessary services by up-
holding a state plan which did provide funding for all thera-
peutic abortions. The Court found that "Pennsylvania's
regulation comports fully with Title XIX's broadly stated pri-
mary objective. ' 46 Justice Brennan dissented in favor of an
40 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974). This case involved a challenge to a Utah policy
similar to the present Hyde Amendment. Despite rejecting the Medicaid argument,
the court invalidated the state policy as invidious discrimination in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1114.
41 Id. at 1114.
42 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
41 Russo, supra note 36, at 1003.
41 Butler, supra note 39, at 941.
41 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 447.
46 Id. at 444. The Pennsylvania plan provided that an abortion is deemed medi-
cally necessary if the health of the mother is threatened, if the infant would have
physical or mental deficiencies, or in cases of rape or incest which might constitute a
threat to the physical and mental health of the patient. 432 U.S. at 441 n.3. It should
be noted that the Hyde Amendment in its broadest form would not cover nearly as
many therapeutic abortions.
Of course, because state plans may finance more types of abortions than are in-
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even broader interpretation of Title XIX that would require
funding for all abortions, refusing to distinguish among those
that are "elective" and those that are "therapeutic." As stated
in his opinion, "Once medical treatment of some sort is neces-
sary... it is beyond comprehension how treatment of thera-
peutic abortions and live births constitute 'necessary medical
services' under Title XIX, but that for elective abortions does
not.
,4 7
The more plausible reading of Beat supports the inclusion
of some abortions within the definition of "medically neces-
sary services." Once this premise is accepted, the threshold of
medical necessity must be defined. This was also done in Beal:
In Doe v. Bolton. . ., this Court indicated that "[W]hether
'an abortion is necessary' is a professional judgment that
... may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical,
emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-
relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors
may relate to health. This allows the attending physician the
room he needs to make his best medical judgment."48
Although other definitions of "medically necessary" have
been propounded,' it would seem that, absent the Hyde
Amendment, a physician's considered opinion would be suffi-
cient to compel state Medicaid funding for an abortion. 0 In-
deed, this was tacitly recognized by the Harris Court.51 The
cluded in the Hyde Amendment, the Court may not have intended to indicate that
such a level of funding was required by the federal Constitution. This fact is made
very clear in Harris.
47 432 U.S. at 450.
48 Id. at 442 n.3.
49 One author has proposed that the proper way to define medical necessity is to
use the definition "used in the medical community: 'the care which is responsive to
the problem for which it is offered' ". Butler, supra note 39, at 955.
80 This is probable since it is likely the Supreme Court will follow its earlier
decision of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Also a recent case, Right to Choose v.
Byrne, 405 A.2d 427 (N.J. 1979), used the broad definition of "medically necessary"
framed in Bolton.
" Referring to the opinion of the District Court, which had found the Hyde
Amendment to be a substantive alteration of Title XIX, Justice Stewart noted: "It
concluded that although Title XIX would otherwise have required a participating
State to include medically necessary abortions in its Medicaid program, the Hyde
Amendment ... relieve[d] a State of that obligation .... We agree with the Dis-
trict Court, but for somewhat different reasons." 100 S. Ct. at 2683 (emphasis added).
1980-81]
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import of Harris, therefore, is that the Hyde Amendment al-
lows a state to withhold funding under Title XIX even though
a medically necessary service is involved.
2. The Effect of the Hyde Amendment on the Medicaid
Act
a. The pre-Harris Judicial Response
When the Harris Court was asked to determine what ef-
fect, if any, the Hyde Amendment was to have on state fund-
ing obligations, 52 it was confronted with two conflicting lines
of precedent. The Amendment had theretofore been given one
of two possible interpretations. It had been construed as: (1) a
funding measure only, thereby requiring the states to fund all
therapeutic abortions to avoid inconsistency with the Medi-
caid Act5" or, (2) a substantive amendment of the Medicaid
Act, which would require states to fund only those abortions
that comport with the Hyde Amendment criteria, leaving the
funding of additional therapeutic abortions to each state's dis-
cretion. 4 Since this issue is purely a question of statutory
construction, 55 the object of the search is congressional intent.
Prior to the decision in Harris, courts attempting to discern
legislative intent in this context had examined four basic fac-
tors: (1) congressional procedural rules; (2) the judicial policy
against repeal by implication; (3) the express terms of the
Hyde Amendment; and, (4) the legislative history of the
Amendment.
Congressional procedural rules favor a limited reading of
the Hyde Amendment, since they clearly prohibit the use of
52 At the time of this writing, forty states have restricted funding for abortions in
a manner similar to the Hyde Amendment. Only the following states and the District
of Columbia have continued to finance all medically necessary abortions: Alaska, Cal-
ifornia, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington,
West Virginia. IX WOMEN TODAY, 56-57 (April 30, 1979).
53 Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326, 1333-34 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
54 Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 134 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
952 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 888 (1980); Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th
Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694 (1980).
55 "It is well settled that if a case may be decided on either statutory or constitu-
tional grounds, this Court, for sound jurisprudential reasons, will inquire first into the
statutory question." Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2683.
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appropriations bills to amend existing legislation
substantively:
No appropriations shall be reported in any general appropri-
ations bill, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for any
expenditures not previously authorized by law, unless in
continuation of appropriations for such public works as are
already in progress. Nor shall any provision in any such bill
or amendment thereto changing existing law be in order."8
In addition to this unambiguous procedural rule, two general
rules of statutory construction favor a limited reading of the
Hyde Amendment. The first states a preference against the
implied repeal of one statute by a subsequent one. 57 The sec-
ond was explained by the Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill:58
"when confronted with a statute which is plain and unambig-
uous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative
history. 5 19
Nevertheless, some courts rejected these rules of con-
struction, turning instead to an analysis of the Amendment's
legislative history. This rejection was the result of an apparent
conflict between the plain words of the statute and the poli-
cies of the Medicaid Act. In Preterm Inc. v. Dukakis," the
First Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply the plain
meaning rule of Hill, stating:
When the plain meaning of a statute produces a result
"plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole" and aid to construction of the meaning of words, as
used in the statute, is available there certainly can be no
"rule of law" which forbids its use, however clear the words
"House Rule XXI (2).
'7 Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 135-38 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal dis-
missed, 444 U.S. 888 (1980).
" 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
Id. at 184 n.29. The Court explained its position further:
The doctrine of disfavoring repeals by implication "applies with full vigor
when ... the subsequent legislation is an appropriations measure." This is
perhaps an understatement since it would be more accurate to say that the
policy applies with even greater force when the claimed repeal rests solely
on an appropriations act.
Id. at 190.
" 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979), appeal dismissed,
444 U.S. 888 (1980).
1980-81]
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may appear on "superficial examination. 81
The court concluded that the absence of congressional state-
ment as to whether states would be required to fund thera-
peutic abortions strongly supported the position that the
states should not be burdened with duties not placed upon
the federal government.62
In Zbaraz v. Quern,63 the Seventh Circuit concurred with
the First Circuit's analysis of the Amendment, noting further:
Moreover, no one, whether supporting or opposing the Hyde
Amendment, ever suggested that state funding would be re-
quired. To the contrary, the assumption was that when fed-
eral funds were withdrawn, the states although free to con-
tinue to pay for abortions not falling within the parameters
of the Hyde Amendment, would refuse to do so."
The Eighth Circuit also felt that the Hyde Amendment
worked a substantive amendment of Title XIX.6 5 Echoing the
Seventh Circuit's thoughts, the Eighth Circuit pointed to leg-
islative history and found that:
[C]ommon sense of the matter is that the supporters of the
Amendment wanted to induce a general halt to the public
financing of abortions, and not to shift, with no apparent
rational motivation, a large part of the cost . . . to the
states. To interpret the Hyde Amendment as anything but a
substantive amendment of Title XIX is to make it a
futility.68
Although the First, Seventh and Eighth Circuits were
persuaded by legislative history that Congress did intend to
61 Id. at 128.
62 Id. at 130, 131.
63 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.), rev'd sub noma., Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694
(1980). The Seventh Circuit, in testing the Illinois statute patterned after the Hyde
Amendment, had remanded to the district court for a finding of the Hyde Amend-
ment's constitutionality. The district court opinion, Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp.
1212 (N.D. Ill.), vacated and remanded, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979), will be a major
focus of this Note's discussion as to the Hyde Amendment's constitutionality.
596 F.2d at 200.
5 Hodgson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 614 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1980).
66 Id. at 614. The dissent, however, cited the "cardinal rule" against repeals by
implication. Id. at 616 (McManus, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 69
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alter the substantive provisions of Title XIX 67 by the Hyde
Amendment, other courts found the rule of construction ar-
ticulated in TVA v. Hill6 8 to compel the opposite conclusion.
In Doe v. Busbee69 a Georgia federal district court determined
that the clear language of the statute demonstrated that the
Hyde Amendment did not work a substantive amendment of
Title XIX, stating: "The Court finds the language of the Hyde
Amendment unambiguous, obviating resort to the legislative
history for its construction. The Hyde Amendment on its face
clearly operates merely to restrict the use of federal funds for
abortion. 7 0 The Busbee court's refusal to scrutinize congres-
sional history is significant. It is consistent with the policy
recognized by the Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill and avoids
the pitfalls of interpreting legislative silence on the issue. 1
The weakness of the view taken by the First and Seventh
Circuits is its dependence upon the significance of congres-
sional silence.7 2 Congress' failure to speak would equally indi-
cate that the states' existing duties under Title XIX were to
remain unaffected. One of those existing duties was the re-
sponsibility to fund "medically necessary" abortions. Cer-
tainly this responsibility under Title XIX expressed by the
Supreme Court in Beal v. Doe7 3 would not have been ignored
by Congress in the event that a substantive amendment was
intended. 4
More importantly, the holding in Doe v. Busbee is sup-
ported by tangible, credible rules of statutory construction
17 See Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d at 201.
68 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
11 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
70 Id. at 1334.
7 See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) and note 59 supra with accompanying
text for a discussion of this policy.
712 The position ultimately taken by the Supreme Court on this issue in Harris v.
McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980), also depends largely on legislative silence, as noted by
the Court: "[Albsent an indication of contrary legislative intent. . ., Title XIX does
not obligate a participating State to pay for those medical services for which federal
reimbursement is unavailable." Id. at 2684 (emphasis added).
7- 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
74 See Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
952 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 888 (1980), for a full discussion of the congres-
sional debates on both sides of the controversy.
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and by direct evidence of congressional intent. The words of
the Amendment purport to be no more than an appropria-
tions bill: "Provided, that none of the funds provided for in
this paragraph shall be used to perform abortions except
where the life of the mother would be endangered . . . [or in
cases of] rape or incest.17 5 In addition, there is no extrinsic
evidence to support the premise that Congress ignored its own
procedural rules. As pointed out by Judge Bownes in his dis-
sent in Preterm, Inc.:
There is scant mention in the congressional debate of these
rules or the fact that both houses intended to flout them.
Are we to assume that Congress deliberately evaded and ig-
nored its own procedural rules, or forgot them, or was en-
tirely ignorant of them?7 1
The compelling inference is that Congress did not intend to
amend substantively the Medicaid Act's provisions that re-
quire states to fund therapeutic abortions.
The Busbee court held that because the Act's provisions
had not been affected by the Hyde Amendment, Georgia was
required to fund all medically necessary abortions to comply
with the Medicaid Act's purposes and regulations.7 7 The
Medicaid regulations, which have the force of law, provide in
part: "The medical agency may not deny or reduce the
amount, duration, or scope of a required service . . . to an
otherwise eligible recipient solely because of the diagnosis,
type of illness, or condition."7 8 The position taken, however,
by the First and Seventh Circuits, as well as that taken by the
Supreme Court in Harris, would require states to fund only
Hyde Amendment abortions.7 9 Following this lead, many
states have enacted legislation patterned after that sponsored
71 Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 3109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979).
"8 591 F.2d at 138 (Bovnes, J., dissenting). Bownes noted that "Senator
Magnuson did state that the amendment should not be part of an appropriations bill,
but did not advert to the Senate rule." Id. at 138 n.3.
7 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
78 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c)(1) (1979).
11 Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952
(1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 888 (1980); Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.
1979), rev'd sub nom. Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694 (1980).
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by Representative Hyde.8 0
b. The Harris Response
In Harris v. McRae a majority of the Court held that
Title XIX "does not require a participating state to pay for
those medically necessary abortions for which federal reim-
bursement is unavailable under the Hyde Amendment." '81 Al-
though a state may choose to continue to fund such abortions
on its own,82 it has been demonstrated that few states will do
so as a practical matter.8 3
The Court's conclusion was in one sense a rejection of all
earlier precedent on the issue. The Medicaid program was
found to be a system of "cooperative federalism, '84 and the
issue of whether Congress had intended a substantive amend-
ment of the Medicaid Act was sidestepped.8 5 As described by
Justice Stewart:
The cornerstone of Medicaid is financial contribution by
both the Federal Government and the participating state.
Nothing in Title XIX as originally enacted, or in its legis-
lative history, suggests that Congress intended to require a
participating state to assume the full costs of providing any
80 See note 52 supra for a list of the few states who still fund all medically neces-
sary abortions.
B 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2685 (1980).
82 "A participating State is free, if it so chooses, to include in its Medicaid plan
those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable."
Id. at 2685 n.16.
83 See note 52 supra for data confirming that most states will refuse to pay for
abortions not within the Hyde Amendment.
84 100 S. Ct. at 2683. The Court cited King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), for this
proposition.
85 Since Title XIX itself provides for variations in the required coverage of
state Medicaid plans depending on changes in the availability of federal
reimbursement, we need not inquire, as the District Court did, whether the
Hyde Amendment is a substantive amendment to Title XIX. The present
case is thus different from T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 [1978], . . . where
the issue was whether continued appropriations for the Tellico Dam im-
pliedly repealed the substantive requirements of the Endangered Species
Act prohibiting the continued construction of the Dam because it
threatened the natural habitat of an endangered species.
Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2684 n.14.
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69
health services in its Medicaid plan.8
The weakness with this position is that the Hyde Amend-
ment did, in effect, work a substantive amendment of Title
XIX by removing a medically necessary service (therapeutic
abortion) from the Act's protection. Furthermore, even the
stance taken by the Harris Court, that no substantive amend-
ment occurred, was based upon congressional intent, and this
intent was discerned from the depths of congressional si-
lence.87 In view of the devastating impact that the Harris de-
cision will have, an impact that was foreseen by the Court,88 a
cursory treatment of this issue is inexcusable.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HYDE AMENDMENT
Given that participating states may refuse to fund abor-
tions under Title XIX due to the Harris interpretation of the
Hyde Amendment," the focus must shift to the Amendment
itself. The Harris Court was faced with a variety of constitu-
tional challenges to the Hyde Amendment," based primarily
on due process and equal protection grounds. Five of the nine
justices found the Amendment to be constitutionally valid.9 1
86 Id. at 2684 (emphasis added). However, see id. at n.13, wherein the Court re-
fers to situations in which states were required to assume the full costs of certain
services.
87 See note 72 supra for a discussion of this point.
88 See Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2706-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 2685; Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694 (1980), rev'g Zbaraz v. Quern,
596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979). Williams was a companion case to Harris and was de-
cided on the same day. The Court in Williams upheld the abortion funding restric-
tions of Illinois. It was noted that after Harris, Title XIX does not require a partici-
pating state to fund abortions for which federal funding is unavailable regardless of
which version of the Hyde Amendment the state has chosen to adopt. 100 S. Ct. at
2701 n.11.
11 Although the Amendment was attacked primarily on the grounds of equal pro-
tection and substantive due process, the appellees also contended that the Hyde
Amendment was in violation of both the establishment clause and the free exercise
clause of the first amendment. The Court had little trouble dismissing both conten-
tions, finding no contravention of the establishment clause since the Hyde Amend-
ment merely coincided with a particular religious viewpoint. The Court declined to
reach the merits of the free exercise challenge since none of the challengers had
standing to raise the issue. Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2689-90.
81 Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980). Justice Stewart delivered the opinion
of the Court which was joined by Justices Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and White.
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In order to understand the impropriety of this position, it
is first necessary to review the earlier decisional law in the
areas of substantive due process and equal protection. It will
then become readily apparent that the Harris ruling was an
abrogation of existing law marking a substantial retreat in the
area of womens' constitutional rights.92
A. Constitutional Law Prior to Harris
1. Substantive Due Process
The constitutional doctrine of substantive due process
provides that where there is a substantial and direct impinge-
ment upon a fundamental right, the government may justify
its action only by demonstrating a compelling state interest.9 3
Such a determination turns upon the judicial definitions of
fundamental rights9" and compelling state interests.
As was previously discussed, the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade9 recognized the woman's right to choose to terminate
her pregnancy as a fundamental right found within the more
generic "zones of privacy" concept.98 This concept first
achieved constitutional status in Griswold v. Connecticut,97
wherein the Court invalidated a state law that prohibited the
use of contraceptives. The individual's interest in contracep-
tive choice was found to be a fundamental right within the
"zones of privacy" protected by the Constitution, and the
state failed to demonstrate a compelling interest for infringe-
Justice White also wrote a separate opinion.
92 "If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condi-
tion of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable
that the guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be
manipulated out of existence." Id. at 2706 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
11 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973), de-
fined those rights that are fundamental as only those that have been explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"o "[T]he Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the constitution." Id. at 152. The
Court further stated that in its view the right of privacy is founded in the fourteenth
amendment's concept of personal liberty. Id. at 153.
07 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ment.9s Griswold and its progeny relating to procreative"9 and
marital00 rights formed the basis for the Roe decision, a deci-
sion that further defined the "zones of privacy" protected by
the fourteenth amendment's personal liberty clause. 101 The
right established in Roe, while not an unqualified right to an
abortion, l0 2 has since been deemed to be a highly protected
right.10 3
The Supreme Court has elaborated on the Roe decision,
finding that statutes requiring spousal or parental consent to
an abortion are unconstitutional. 04 In Bellotti v. Baird,05
which struck down such a consent requirement, the Court ar-
ticulated a standard under the due process clause for measur-
ing the validity of a state abortion regulation. Any state law
that unduly burdens a woman's right to obtain an abortion in
the first trimester of pregnancy may not be justified by any
interest. Finally, in Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, 16 the Court invalidated a New York statute that for-
bade the sale of contraceptives to minors under sixteen years
of age, reasoning that the right of privacy also protects deci-
98 Id. at 485-86.
9 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (single and married persons
have a right to equal access to contraceptives); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (fundamental rights of marriage and procreation violated by state law
which required sterilization of persons convicted more than twice of felonies involving
moral turpitude).
'"
0 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia law prohibiting interracial
marriage held to violate the freedom to marry).
'' See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
102 The Roe Court explained that the right to an abortion was properly regulated
by the state only in the second trimester, where the state could regulate the proce-
dure for the mother's health, and in the third trimester, where the state could pro-
scribe abortion except when the mother's life or health was endangered. Id. at 164-65.
Thus, it is only in the second and third trimesters that the state has a compelling
interest sufficient to impinge upon the woman's right to choose an abortion. Id.
103 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
104 See id.; Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). The Danforth Court reasoned
that "since the state cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage [of
pregnancy], when the physician and his patient make the decision, the state cannot
delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion dur-
ing that same period." 428 U.S. at 69.
105 428 U.S. 132 (1976). In striking down the state's interpretation of the parental
consent requirements as "parental veto," the Court called such an interpretation an
undue burden. Id. at 147.
106 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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sions relating to marriage and procreation. Justice Brennan,
writing the majority opinion, stated: "[A]ny regulations bur-
dening the decision whether to bear a child mandates applica-
tion of the compelling interest standard. '10 7
The stage was finally set for the Harris decision by three
cases decided in 1977. In Maher v. Roe,1"8 the Court, some-
what surprisingly in light of Carey, applied a rational basis
standard to determine the constitutional propriety of a state
scheme funding childbirth expenses while failing to provide
funds for elective abortions.109 The Supreme Court concluded
that such a scheme was a valid exercise of state power and
that the state regulation disallowing nontherapeutic"0° abor-
tions did not unduly burden the woman's right to decide to
end her pregnancy."' In Beal v. Doe,11 2 a companion case, the
Court held that Title XIX does not require state funding of
elective abortions. In a third case, Poelker v. Doe," 3 the Court
held that a municipal welfare regulation which forbade the
performance of any elective abortions was not violative of the
fourteenth amendment. It should be noted that each of these
three decisions dealt with the right to funding for an elective,
or nontherapeutic, abortion.
2. Equal Protection
The primary principle of the equal protection clause is
that if a particular government action unduly burdens a "sus-
pect classification" of persons, the government must then
demonstrate a compelling interest to justify the action."4 The
compelling interest standard of review will also apply when
the fundamental rights of a particular group are impeded. Ab-
107 Id. at 686.
108 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
"I Id. at 474.
10 It is very important to recognize that the Connecticut Welfare Department
regulations challenged in Maher involved funding for elective, or nontherapeutic,
abortions. Id. at 466.
"I Id. at 484.
122 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
113 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
124 See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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sent the existence of a fundamental right or a suspect class, a
less demanding standard of review, the "rational relationship"
test, will apply. Under the lesser standard, the government
must only demonstrate its action to be "rationally related to a
legitimate purpose.11
The Court in Maher v. Roe""6 easily dismissed the conten-
tion that a suspect classification was involved.1 17 This was
done by pointing out that neither wealth'18 nor gender-based
classifications" 9 contain the traditional indicia of specially
protected classes. Furthermore, the Maher Court concluded
that there was no infringement of a fundamental right, 20 em-
phasizing that there is a difference between direct state inter-
ference with a protected right and mere state encouragement
of an alternate activity.' 21 The policy of favoring funding for
childbirth and excluding monies for elective abortions was
found to be a proper value judgment within the legislature's
discretion. The exercise of this discretion was said to place
"no obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant wo-
man's path to an abortion.' 1 22 Three dissenting justices 123 an-
115 It has been observed that the Burger Court, as opposed to the Warren Court,
requires greater state justification for the rational relationship test, while requiring
less rigor in the application of strict scrutiny. Id. at 8.
1 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
117 The Court has recognized very few "suspect" classes: (1) race or national ori-
gin was first viewed as a suspect class in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); (2) alienage has been recognized as suspect in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971); (3) illegitimacy was deemed suspect in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977); and (4) gender-based classifications have sometimes been subjected to an in-
termediate level of scrutiny. See note 119 infra for a brief discussion of this standard.
118 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodrignez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). In
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court stated: "An indigent woman desiring an
abortion does not come within the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recog-
nized by our cases." Id. at 470-71.
119 Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974). Gender classifications are not sus-
pect, but they often are scrutinized under an intermediate test, which, though un-
clear, has been said to require that any classification based on sex "must serve impor-
tant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
120 432 U.S. at 474.
121 Id.
122 Id. This position has been criticized in that it fails to account for the proposi-
tion that "'State encouragement of an alternate activity consonant with legislative
policy' must be recognizable as something other than a disapproval of an effort to
discourage the protected activity. Otherwise, 'the right to encouragement' will consti-
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grily attacked this position by demonstrating that in the con-
text of other fundamental rights, absolute obstacles had not
been required to invalidate the law.-2"
The state regulation in Maher was upheld when subjected
to the rational relationship test.12 5 The query was whether a
legitimate state purpose was promoted by treating Medicaid
women seeking money for childbirth differently from those
seeking money for elective abortions. The Court found Con-
necticut's distinction to be rationally related to the legitimate
state purpose of encouraging childbirth. 12 After Maher, the
remaining question was whether the same analysis would
apply when funding for medically necessary abortions was
withheld.
B. The Constitutional Analysis in Harris
1. Substantive Due Process
Following Maher, there was some reason to believe that a
substantive due process argument could be used more effec-
tively in the Harris context. It appeared that a fundamental
tute nothing more than a covert form of state interference with that activity." Perry,
supra note 29, at 1198.
123 Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Brennan dissented in Maher.
21 432 U.S. at 487. Brennan relied upon the following cases to support that pro-
position: Linmark Ass'n. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (freedom of
expression); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise of religion).
125 Under the rational relationship test, state laws are easily upheld, whereas
under strict scrutiny, state laws and policies are normally invalidated. Between these
tests lies an intermediate level of review advocated by Justice Marshall, a standard
which would have proven effective in Harris. See Note, Medicaid Funding for Abor-
tions: The Medicaid Statute and the Equal Protection Clause, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV.
421, 432-33 (1978).
Marshall's theory is also called the "sliding scale" approach, because it weighs
the importance of the governmental benefits denied, the character of the class, and
the asserted state interests. Marshall, dissenting in Beal, would have invalidated the
state regulation since the state's interest in the fetus is outweighed by the important
governmental benefits denied, with a crucial consideration being that the class af-
fected is the poor. 432 U.S. at 458. While it is unclear which rights will trigger the
intermediate level of review, middle-tier scrutiny has been applied to classifications
based on illegitimacy, gender, and the right to marry. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (right to marry); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977)
(illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (gender).
'2" 432 U.S. at 478. See also Right to Choose v. Byrne, 398 A.2d 587 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1979).
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constitutional right to a "medically necessary" abortion, as
opposed to a purely elective one, might indeed exist.12 7 In-
deed, it was argued that the "absolute obstacle" test of the
majority in Maher might be applied to indigents desiring
abortions because a lack of funding in such a case might con-
stitute a direct barrier. It seemed "clear under Roe [v. Wade]
and Doe [v. Bolton] that a complete ban on surgical procedure
relating to the fundamental interest in the pregnancy decision
is far too broad when other comparable surgical procedures
are performed. 1 28 The Harris decision laid such notions to
rest by flatly stating that the Hyde Amendment was not a vio-
lation of substantive due process.129
Essentially, the Harris Court extended the rationale of
Maher to the situation where a medically necessary abortion
is sought. Maher was seen as standing for the proposition that
"Wade and its progeny did not prevent a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement[ing]
that judgment by the allocation of public funds."13 In accor-
dance with this position, it was found that the Hyde Amend-
ment "places no governmental obstacle in the path of a wo-
man who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by
means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical
services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public
interest." 131
It is at this point that the rationale of Maher, as it reap-
pears in Harris, breaks down. The majority position in both
cases is fallacious because it is based upon an entirely false
premise, that a withdrawal of funding leaves the indigent wo-
12' See generally Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). Although in the aftermath of
Maher it appeared that an equal protection argument would be more effective than
one based on due process in the context of medically necessary abortions, there was
some support for the latter approach. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) (substantive due process was applied by the Court to protect the sanctity of
the family from intrusive city regulation). At least one author has attacked the Court
for failing to use substantive due process in the abortion context. Perry, supra note
29, at 1221. But see Fahy, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Response To Professor
Perry, 67 GEO. L.J. 1205 (1979) (approving of the Court's use of equal protection).
128 Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital, 475 F.2d 701, 706 (1st Cir. 1973).
129 100 S. Ct. at 2689.
120 Id. at 2687.
131 Id.
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man with a choice as to whether to terminate her
pregnancy.132
Every abortion decision since Roe, including Harris, has
recognized that a pregnant woman has a right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy and that this choice is hers alone in
most instances. 3 3 On a purely theoretical basis, the majority
in Harris correctly observes that the Hyde Amendment places
no obstacle in the path of a woman choosing to exercise this
right. In reality, however, any choice has been "effectively re-
moved. . . from the indigent woman's hands."'1 4 By funding
all of the expenses associated with childbirth and none of the
expenses incurred in terminating pregnancy, the government
literally "makes an offer that the indigent woman cannot af-
ford to refuse."' 35
The Hyde Amendment and the Harris decision further-
more are not in keeping with the principle espoused in Roe v.
Wade. 36 Roe promises a woman the unqualified right to ter-
minate her pregnancy during the first trimester and thereafter
when her life or health is endangered. The Hyde Amendment,
by withdrawing necessary funds, renders an indigent woman
completely incapable of exercising her constitutional preroga-
tive. After Harris, this obstacle exists even if the desired abor-
tion is medically necessary and even where severe health dam-
age might result either to the mother or to the fetus if carried
132 This inherent defect is correctly highlighted by Justice Brennan: "The funda-
mental flaw in the Court's due process analysis is its failure to acknowledge that the
discriminatory distribution of the benefits of the governmental largesse can discour-
age the exercise of fundamental liberties just as effectively as can an outright denial
of these rights through criminal and regulatory sanctions." Id. at 2704 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). These sentiments echoed those he had earlier expressed in Maher.
To sanction such a ruthless consequence, inevitably resulting from a
money hurdle erected by the State, would justify a latter-day Anatole
France to add one more item to his ironic comments on the "majestic
equality," of the law. "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as
well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
bread."
432 U.S. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33 Indeed this was recognized by the Harris Court. 100 S. Ct. at 2686.
,31 100 S. Ct. at 2704 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135 Id.




Finally, the Harris Court's reliance on Maher is mis-
placed, for the situations involved in the two cases were strik-
ingly different. The relief sought in Maher was federal fund-
ing for nontherapeutic abortions. By definition, such abortions
are not "medically necessary" within the requirements of the
Medicaid Act.138 By contrast, the Harris case involved thera-
peutic abortions, which do fall within the "medically neces-
sary" limitation on Medicaid eligibility. While the Maher de-
cision may have been incorrect, the mischief it worked pales
when compared to the terrible injustice of Harris.
2. Equal Protection
The equal protection analysis applied in Harris is fatally
defective in at least three important respects: (1) an inappro-
priate standard of review was applied; (2) the Court failed to
define the burdened class; and (3) the Hyde Amendment
should have been declared unconstitutional even under the ra-
tional relationship test.
a. Standard of Review
Although some support for application of the strict scru-
tiny standard in the Harris context does exist, 139 it became
137 Justice Marshall points to four areas in which the Hyde Amendment works to
withold funding despite the severe and long-lasting health problems that are certain
to occur: (1) the Amendment prohibits federal funding for abortions that are neces-
sary in order to protect the health and sometimes the life of the mother; (2) funding
is denied in cases in which severe mental disturbances will be created by unwanted
pregnancies resulting in suicide, attempts at self-abortion, or child abuse; (3) the
Amendment denies funding for the majority of women whose pregnancies have been
caused by rape or incest; and (4) federal funding is unavailable even cases where it is
known that the fetus will be unable to survive. 100 S. Ct. at 2707 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
,01 "A fundamentally different question was decided in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464. . . . Unlike these plaintiffs, the plaintiffs in Maher did not satisfy the neutral
criterion of medical need, they sought a subsidy for nontherapeutic abor-
tions-medical procedures which by definition they did not need." 100 S. Ct. at 2712
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
"I See, e.g., Reproduction Health Services v. Freeman, 614 F.2d 585 (8th Cir.
1980); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 398 A.2d 587 (N.J. Super. 1979). The Byrne case
provided that:
After Medicaid funding for medically necessary abortions for the protection
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apparent with the Maher decision that the rational relation-
ship test was more likely to be applied.14 ° A simplistic, two-
tiered approach to all equal protection questions has often
proved unsatisfactory, 41 however, and the Harris situation il-
lustrates its shortcomings.
There is a great disparity between the two prevailing
standards of equal protection review-strict scrutiny and ra-
tional relationship; moreover, there are many potential classes
of persons that fit neatly into neither category. While classifi-
cations based on gender1 42 and wealth 143 may not be affected
with the traditional indicia which makes a class suspect,14 4
laws that burden these classes should certainly be subjected to
harsher review than laws which distinguish between opticians
of pregnant women's health was made available, its witholding should not
be discriminatory, barring funding for abortions but not for other medically
necessary treatments and procedures, except on the basis of a compelling
state interest under federal constitutional law.
Id. at 594.
140 "Maher compels the conclusion, therefore, that [the Illinois statute restricting
abortion funding] impinges on no fundamental right and should not be subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny." Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212, 1217 (N.D. Ill.), vacated
and remanded, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub noam., Wil-
liams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694 (1980).
141 See note 125 supra for a discussion of Justice Marshall's alternative approach
to equal protection problems.
142 Although gender-based classifications have been reviewed under an interme-
diate standard, see note 119 supra, it is difficult to define the class of persons bur-
dened by the Hyde Amendment by sexual criteria. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974). In Geduldig, a case involving a challenge to a state disability insurance
plan which did not cover pregnancy, the Court rejected a gender-based classification:
The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women
and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the
second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of
the program thus accrue to members of both sexes.
Id. at 497 n.20. Presumably, this kind of analysis would prohibit a gender-based clas-
sification of a group of women who desire medically necessary abortions as versus
men who desire other medically necessary operations. The Court could redraw the
classes, as in Geduldig, to the class of women who seek an abortionversus those who
do not. Since women fall into both categories, there would be no finding of gender-
based discrimination. It is undeniable, however, that the classification in such cases,
however drawn, indeed has some sexual overtones, even if it does not fit neatly into a
gender-based category.
142 See note 147 infra and accompanying text for the manner in which the Harris
Court identified the subject class and applied a two-tiered analysis.
'44 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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and opthalmologists. 145 It would certainly seem proper that
when the burdened class is defined in terms of both wealth
and sex a stricter standard should apply. When coupled with
the fact that the burdened class is deprived of the opportunity
to exercise a fundamental right, the need for stricter review
becomes obvious.
b. Defining the Class
Perhaps the failure of the Harris Court to apply an ap-
propriate standard of review, and the further failure to prop-
erly resolve the case upon the standard which was applied, is
in part attributable to the fact that no burdened class was
ever defined. The majority opinion, relying on Maher,'1 6 made
but a feeble attempt to identify the burdened class, stating:
It is our view that the present case is indistinguisable from
Maher in this respect. Here, as in Maher, the principal im-
pact of the Hyde Amendment falls on the indigent. But the
fact does not render the funding restriction constitutionally
invalid, for this Court has held repeatedly that poverty,
standing alone, is not a suspect classification. 47
While more thoughtful efforts have been made at properly de-
fining the class involved,148 it is clear that indigency is not the
only distinguishing feature of the class burdened by the Hyde
Amendment. Its members are women, and they are women
who seek to exercise a constitutional right. Furthermore, while
the majority may have perceived the situation as being "indis-
115 Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2708 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Mar-
shall was referring to the rational relationship test as applied in Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
146 The Maher Court had earlier found that "[an indigent woman desiring an
abortion does not come within the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recog-
nized by our cases." 432 U.S. at 471, citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Note, however, that
"an indigent woman desiring an abortion" involves a category described in terms of
wealth, sex, and pursuit of fundamental rights.
147 100 S. Ct. 2691 (1980).
148 See, e.g., Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill.), vacated and re-
manded, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub noma. Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct.
2694 (1980); Reproduction Health Services v. Freeman, 614 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1980);
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 405 A.2d 427 (N.J. Super. 1979).
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tinguishable from Maher," it should be noted that the Harris
situation also involved the health of the mother, a factor not
present in Maher. This factor, however, was a "distinction
without a difference" to Justice Stewart.149
c. The Rational Relationship Test
In order to remain consistent with established constitu-
tional doctrine and Maher v. Roe,150 it was perhaps foresee-
able that the Court would apply the rational relationship test
in Harris. The unwelcome surprise was that the Hyde Amend-
ment was found to comport with the constitution under that
standard.151
Perhaps the most effective way of depicting the inade-
quacy of Harris is by examining the treatment given the same
issue in Zbaraz v. Quern, 52 a case decided by an Illinois fed-
eral district court and which ultimately reached the Supreme
Court as a companion case to Harris.5 5 In Zbaraz, the court
considered the two classes created by the Hyde Amendment
and its state prototype, holding that each failed to bear a rea-
sonable relationship to a legitimate government purpose. 154
The Zbaraz court refused to analyze the case on the basis of
gender discrimination, applying the rational relationship to
two classes of women requiring medically necessary abortions.
In defining the classes involed and delineating the applicable
standard, the Court stated: "Here since indigent women in
,40 100 S. Ct. at 2691.
1-0 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
151 Under Title XIX and the Hyde Amendment, funding is available for es-
sentially all necessary medical treatment for the poor. Respondents have
met the statutory requirements for eligibility, but they are excluded be-
cause the treatment that is medically necessary involves the exercise of a
fundamental right, the right to choose an abortion. In short, respondents
have been deprived of a governmental benefit for which they are otherwise
eligible, solely because they have attempted to exercise a constitutional
right.... In such circumstances the Hyde Amendment must be invali-
dated because it does not meet even the rational-basis standard of review.
100 S. Ct. at 2710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill.), vacated and remanded, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.
1979), rev'd sub nom. Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694 (1980).
153 See note 89 supra for a synopsis of this case.
1" 469 F. Supp. at 1218.
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medical need of abortion are treated differently than indigent
women in need of other surgical procedures, we must subject
the statute to the rational relationship test.'1 55 This conclu-
sion is consistent with Maher v. Roe.15 6
The state and federal governments alleged that two legiti-
mate interests were forwarded by the legislation: (1) fiscal fru-
gality; and (2) the protection of the fetus.157 The Zbaraz court
rejected the first ground summarily, stating that "the record
in this case supports the contrary conclusion that the costs of
prenatal care and post partum care are substantially higher
than the cost of abortions. 1 5 The state's interest in the pro-
tection of the fetus, however, was given serious consideration.
Although this interest was found controlling in Maher, it was
not as persuasive to the Zbaraz court when weighed against
the mother's interest in her own health.159 The reason that the
Hyde Amendment and its state counterparts were deemed so
dangerous was precisely because they do not cover most
"health problems associated with pregnancy . . . and those
that would be covered would often not be apparent until the
later stages of pregnancy, when an abortion is more dangerous
to the mother."1 e0 Because conditions such as sickle-cell dis-
ease were excluded,' 6 ' the court ruled that a statute cannot
155 Id.
1-6 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See note 142 supra for an explanation of why the Hyde
Amendment was not scrutinized under an intermediate standard.
151 469 F. Supp. at 1218-19.
158 Id. at 1218. "Plaintiff's have produced convincing statistical evidence that the
average state payment for an abortion is approximately $145.00, compared to an aver-
age cost to the State of $1,370.00 for funding a childbirth." Id. at 1218 n.8. See also
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The Court's
financial argument ... is specious [considering] the welfare costs that will burden
the state for the new indigents and their support in the long, long years ahead." Id.
119 Id. at 1219. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
160 469 F. Supp. at 1220. In Right to Choose v. Byrne, 405 A.2d 427 (N.J. 1979),
the New Jersey court cited examples of health problems not covered by the Hyde
Amendment: "Examples include all those with psychological health disorders, and
many, particularly in the initial stages of pregnancy, whose diagnosis is heart disease,
diabetes, kidney disease, chronic lung disease, sickle cell anemia, drug addiction, ex-
cessive nausea with dehydration, hypertension, thrombophlebitis, skin cancer, gas-
trointestioral ulcers, or ulcerative colitis." Id. at 429.
101 The Court also explained that the Illinois law ignored the serious threat to an
indigent pregnant woman's psychological health. For example, the court noted that
sickle-cell disease, which causes pregnant women to retain a 25% probability of going
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protect a non-viable fetus where the price is to increase ma-
ternal morbidity and mortality. It was found that "a pregnant
woman's interest in her health so outweighs any possible state
interest in the life of a non-viable fetus that, for a woman
medically in need of an abortion, the state's interest is not
legitimate. ' 162 Therefore, the court found both the Hyde
Amendment and the Illinois statute unconstitutional"6 ' as a
denial of equal protection under the rational relationship
test.
e1 6
Zbaraz was not the first case which invalidated a law dis-
criminating between classes of similarly situated beneficiaries
of government-provided surgical procedures. In Hathaway v.
Worcester City Hospital,e5 the First Circuit found that a
state could not permissibly distinguish between tubal ligations
and comparable surgical procedures under either the strict
scrutiny or the rational relationship test.16 6 As stated therein,
"once the state has undertaken to provide general short-term
hospital care, as here, it may not constitutionally draw the
line at medically indistinguishable surgical procedures that
impinge on fundamental rights.11 7 The Hathaway court was
faced with a personal right similar to that in Zbaraz, i.e., the
into "sickle-cell crisis" resulting in death, makes abortions for these women "univer-
sally acknowledged" as medically necessary. 469 F. Supp. at 1220 nn.11-12.
162 Id. at 1221.
113 The district court explained that the Seventh Circuit's mandate included a
directive to pass on the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, as well as the
Illinois statute, even though only the Illinois statute was attacked. Thus the United
States government was allowed to intervene pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) (1976).
The district court concluded: "Therefore, while our discussion of the constitutional
questions will address only the Illinois statute the same analysis applies to the Hyde
Amendment and the relief granted will encompass both laws." Id. at 1215 n.3. The
Supreme Court later determined, however, that the district court had exceeded its
jurisdictional authority by ruling upon the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment
"in the absence of a case or controversy sufficient to permit an exercise of judicial
power under Art. III of the Constitution." Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694, 2700
(1980).
"I Id. at 1221. See also Reproductive Health Services v. Freeman, 614 F.2d 585
(8th Cir. 1980), where the rational relationship test was used to invalidate a Missouri
abortion restriction.
"' 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973).
166 Id. at 705.
17 Id. at 706.
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right to choose whether a pregnancy should be prevented. 16 8
Both courts invalidated the legislation before them under the
rational relationship test. The Harris Court would have been
wiser to follow such reasoning.
III. THE IMPACT OF Harris v. McRae
The most disturbing aspect of Harris is the impact the
decision will have on society. It is estimated that 4.6 million
American women of reproductive age are eligible for Medi-
caid, with 2.6 million of them each year risking an unwanted
pregnancy. 16 9 It is significant that 427,000 of that number
wish to end that pregnancy with an abortion and that a ma-
jority of this group are young white women.170 These facts
support the proposition that with the Hyde Amendment in
force, economic status will be a significant factor preventing
many women from obtaining a medically necessary abor-
tion.17 1 This unmet demand for abortions raises several other
social problems, including: (1) illegitimacy; (2) unstable mar-
riages, especially where teenagers are involved;172 (3) deep-
ened poverty;17 3 (4) a greater dependency on welfare funds af-
ter the child is born;17 4 and (5) danger to womens' lives from
"back alley" abortions.17 5 Nonetheless, proponents of the
Amendment emphasize the social and moral grounds support-
168 Id. at 705.
"9 IX WOMEN TODAY 56 (April 30, 1979).
171 Id. These statistics further indicate that 80% of the women in this group are
already mothers of young babies. Id.
11 Id. at 57. Cf. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 398 A.2d 587 (N.J. Super. 1979).
172 See 123 CONG. REc. H4940 (daily ed. July 28, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Ed-
wards) for a thorough discussion of the disastrous effects of this law on teenagers who
have unwanted pregnancies: (1) Babies are two to three times as likely to die in the
first year; (2) 60% higher maternal death rate for teens than for other mothers; (3)
50% of teenage marriages result in divorce within six years. Id. (quoting Beilenson,
Now the Abortion Debate Centers on the Poor, L. A. Times).
17 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun J., dissenting). "There is
another world 'out there,' the existence of which the Court, I suspect, either chooses
to ignore or fears to recognize. And so the cancer of poverty will continue to grow."
Id.
d7 See WOMEN TODAY, supra note 169, at 57. "The first year medical and welfare
costs to society failing to offer poor women the abortions they seek range from $75.2
million to $340 million." Id.
172 See note 178 infra for authority relating to this increased danger.
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ing the right of unborn children to live. 176
Society has a substantial economic interest in the result
as well. According to HEW estimates, the price of each un-
wanted child is $2,200.00. 7 Even more important than the
financial stake, however, is the danger to womens' lives:
"Since the Hyde Amendment, HEW statistics revealed as
many as four times the number of abortion-related complica-
tions have entered the country's hospitals.' 7  As stated by
Justice Marshall: "An optimistic estimate indicates that as
many as 100 excess deaths may occur each year as a result of
the Hyde Amendment. The record contains no estimate of the
health damage that may occur to poor women, but it shows
that it will be considerable.' 1 9 Therefore, it is clear that by
allowing the Hyde Amendment to stand, the Harris decision
has affected large numbers of the nation's poor women: °80
"The incontrovertible effect of the statute under attack has
been to block Medicaid eligible women from medically neces-
sary abortions."' 8 '
176 See 122 CONG. REc. H6648 (daily ed. June 24, 1976) (remarks of Rep.
Bauman).
,77 NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1977, at 12, 13. See note 158 supra for a discussion of the
increased costs to the welfare program that result from abortion funding restrictions.
178 Note, A Right Without Access? Payment for Elective Abortions After Maher
v. Roe, 7 CAP. U. L. REv. 483, 490 (1978). The statistics confirm the inevitable-that
"butchershop abortions" will replace medically safe abortions. Ms., January 1979, at
66. For example, a mother of six from St. Louis, Missouri articulated the fear of
many Medicaid eligible women: "I thank the Lord when I laid down on that table
that I didn't have to go to one of those quacks who mess you up. I can't afford the
children I got." NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1977, at 12-13.
17' Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2707 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "For example,
the risk of serious complications deriving from abortions were estimated to be about
100 times the number of deaths from abortions." Id. at 2707 n.2.
,"I Curiously, although the impact of the Hyde Amendment will fall upon poor
women and children, during the debate over funding for fiscal year 1979-80, the
health of animals was compared to that of fetuses: "A bird, a crow, an eagle, a snail
darter, has more legal protection than an unborn being .... It is intolerable that
this can exist in a society that calls itself caring and humane." 124 CONG. REc. H5362
(daily ed. June 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Hyde). "[Ilt disturbs me when I hear mem-
bers of this House come down in the well and talk about birds and crows and eagles
.... We are talking about American women. 124 CONG. REc. H5363 (daily ed.
June 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Stokes).




The upshot of Harris v. McRae18 2 is that neither the fed-
eral government nor the states will be required to fund a great
many medically necessary abortions in the days to come. It is
deplorable that the heavy impact of this decision will fall
upon the shoulders of those already impoverished. As ably
expressed by Justice Blackmun:
The enactments challenged here brutally coerce poor women
to bear children whom society will scorn for every day of
their lives .... I am appalled at the ethical bankruptcy of
those who preach a "right to life" that means under present
social policies, a bare existence in utter misery for so many
poor women and their children .... 183
It is indeed ironic that while the primary purpose of the
Medicaid Act was to break the poverty chain, through the
Hyde Amendment the Act will now serve to increase depen-
dence on welfare. 18 4 Finally, there exists the real danger that
women denied Medicaid funds will resort to illegal abortion-
ists, causing many injuries and deaths.
Magnifying a thousand times the devastating impact of
the Harris decision is the fact that the case was wrongly de-
cided. The Court could well have decided the case on statu-
tory grounds, which would have imposed an obligation upon
participating states to continue funding all medically neces-
sary abortions. There was ample authority to support such a
decision.
When, as a result of its statutory interpretation, the
Court found it necessary to address the constitutional issues,
the approach taken was highly circumspect. The due process
analysis bypassed the implications of Roe v. Wade' 8 and was
based upon the false premise that an indigent woman denied
Medicaid funding may nonetheless choose to terminate her
pregnancy. The equal protection analysis of the majority
182 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
183 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
, ' See notes 158 & 177 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this
result.
-0- 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
[Vol. 69
1980-81] ABORTIONS FOR POOR WOMEN 391
failed to define the injured class, applied an inappropriate
standard of review, and wrongly applied the standard which
was selected. The constitutional rights of the nation's poor
women were wounded by the legislature which passed the
Hyde Amendment. The Supreme Court's decision in Harris
has salted, not healed, those wounds.
Catherine Cundiff Sewell
Mary Anne Wetterer
